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Abstract 
In studies of the diffusion or translation of management ideas, power is frequently implied but is rarely 
theorised explicitly. Moreover, when it is recognised, the focus is often on only one form of power. 
This can obscure how different forms of power relate to each-other, shape idea diffusion, and connect 
to different forms of resistance. Using Lukes’ classic framing of power, we explore the activities of a 
key agent in the diffusion of ideas – management consultancy – and one of the leading players in that 
field - McKinsey & Co. We draw on diverse, publicly available forms of data on three different 
management ideas to identify how different forms of power and resistance enable and constrain the 
diffusion of management ideas. Our study emphasises both the dynamic relations between different 
forms of power over time and the importance of acknowledging the unintended consequences of power. 
At the same time, by focusing on power dynamics mostly operating outside of consulting projects, we 
add to our understanding of the role of consultancy in the diffusion of management ideas more 
generally. 
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Introduction  
In recent years, attention has been given to how management ideas spread and change within and 
between organisations, sectors and nations (e.g.Birkinshaw et al., 2008). Yet, despite the centrality of 
power as a concept in social and management studies (Courpasson et al., 2012) and a wide recognition 
that ideas need power to ‘move’ and take root, it is still common to see research on management ideas 
which make no reference to power. Such inattention is evident even in situations where power is 
otherwise explicit such as when actors appear to impose ideas upon resistant others (van Veen et al., 
2011; Fu, 2012; Birkinshaw et al., 2008). Where power is mentioned explicitly, diffusion research tends 
to adopt a singular, rather than multi-dimensional view. For example, the most common perspective in 
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management focuses on resource-based conflicts between different actors, where one group, generally 
management, seeks to implement management innovations, whilst others, often employees, resist (e.g. 
Delbridge et al., 2007). Whilst such studies reveal the tensions between different groups, their focus on 
direct conflicts delimits an analysis of the wider, often discursive, forms of power that are also important 
(e.g. Mueller and Whittle, 2011). Conversely, these approaches often reject research that focuses on 
more structural or resource-based deployments of power (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Frenkel, 2005). 
Other approaches, such as actor network accounts, draw attention to power through the associations of 
networks and the active role of non-human actors (Bloomfield and Best, 1992), especially in the 
translation of ideas (Whittle and Spicer, 2008). Overall, the effect of singular approaches to power has 
been ‘to provide a limited and impoverished conceptualization of, power, authority and domination’ 
(Zald and Lounsbury, 2010: 933).  
Accordingly, we seek to explore how different forms of power enable and constrain the diffusion of 
management ideas. To achieve this, we analyse the case of one of the most well-known management 
consultancy firms - McKinsey & Co. - using Lukes’ (2005; 1974) tripartite framing of power. Drawing 
on publicly available sources, we show how McKinsey deploys multiple forms of power, but is also 
substantially resisted, not only by clients, but by a range of agentic, institutional and ideological factors 
that are rarely considered together. Our study also has a secondary contribution in allowing us to explore 
how different types of power interrelate dynamically, and how unintended consequences are important 
in power analyses. We suggest that these insights not only help in understanding the diffusion of 
management ideas, but add to our understanding of management consultancy, especially in contexts 
beyond those of the client project (c.f. Nikolova, 2007). 
Below, we first show how studies of the spread of management ideas which discuss power tend to do 
so by focusing on only one form. We then briefly introduce Lukes’ (2005) model in this context and 
outline how it might be developed and adapted before explaining our selection of consultants and the 
McKinsey case. We then set out three vignettes of ideas illustrating McKinsey’s involvement in power 
relations. In our analysis, we show how developing and applying Lukes’ model helps us better 
understand the spread of, and resistance to, management ideas. 
 
Management ideas and power  
In studies of the diffusion or translation of management ideas, power is frequently implied but is rarely 
theorised explicitly. New management ideas which help shape changes in practices and identities can 
require considerable political effort but also lead to contestation. For example, in Rogers’ classic text 
on innovations, a strong theme is that ideas ‘do not sell themselves’ but require ‘opinion leadership’ 
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from those ‘in a system who possess power, status or technical expertise’ (1995: 7, 27). Yet, even in 
this text, power is barely otherwise mentioned. Of course, power is recognised in the literature, but even 
in those studies where it is an explicit focus, power tends to be seen with a singular emphasis, often as 
a resource of the person, hierarchical structure, network location or association (e.g. Ibarra, 1993). This 
pattern is echoed in our specific area of concern - the diffusion of management ideas. For example, in 
one comprehensive review of the management innovation literature (Birkinshaw et al., 2008), power, 
politics and interests are all but absent from the analysis. Different dimensions of power are sometimes 
acknowledged. For example, in Sturdy (2004) classification of the diffusion literature in management, 
he identifies political perspectives as important, such as the attention given to the imposition of ideas, 
their use for ulterior motives and their shaping of subjectivities. Moreover, in emphasising the lack of 
engagement between these perspectives, Sturdy also urges consideration of ‘the possibilities for, and 
desirability of, theoretical integration’ (p. 168). 
In framing this literature below, we use the three forms of power detailed by Lukes (1974; 2005). 
Clearly, there are potentially many approaches to power that we could have used, but the value of Lukes’ 
model for our purposes is that it explicitly sets out different forms of power and has been subjected to 
various forms of developmental critique over the years (e.g.Bradshaw, 1976; Edwards, 2006; Hardy 
and Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998). Indeed, recent formulations of power in diverse forms often use categories 
derived explicitly from Lukes’ work (e.g. Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Furthermore, it is one of the few 
frameworks to have been used to study multiple forms of power explicitly in relation to management 
innovation (e.g. Swan and Scarbrough, 2005; Ferner et al., 2012; Gordon, 2005).  
In the diffusion of management ideas literature, the most common form of power described or implied 
concerns groups or individuals using resource-based power to impose, adapt or resist management 
ideas. This can be seen in relation to struggles between managers and workers (e.g. Delbridge et al., 
2007); multi-nationals and subsidiaries (Kostova and Roth, 2002); or the state, industry and unions 
(Frenkel, 2005). Resources, such as hierarchical authority, capital and expertise, are used by groups to 
legitimate and support the imposition of new ideas on others, but also to adapt or translate those ideas. 
Lukes argues that such ‘resource based power’ is exercised in a direct, largely observable manner: 
attempting to force groups to act in ways that may be contrary to their espoused interests. Resistance is 
often equally visible and overt: workers strike, governments refuse bail-outs, populations riot (McCabe 
et al., 1998). Such conflict will often result in the translation of the proposed change into a local context 
such that its manifestation becomes a temporary compromise between actors (Czarniawska-Joerges and 
Sevón, 1996). More generally, Lukes sees resistance as ‘internal to, and so generated by, power’ (2005: 
95), but resistance, as we shall see, is by no means inevitable - it is ‘only one among many responses’ 
and may coincide with non-resistant practices (2005: 131). 
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Another form of power is evinced where groups seek to emasculate others, often prior to the 
implementation of new management practices, so to minimise resistance (e.g. Mazza and Pedersen, 
2004). This is witnessed in studies of organisational change where de-unionisation and casualisation 
are not only implemented as management ideas in themselves, but are also strategies which facilitate 
the implementation of other ideas by weakening oppositional groups (e.g. Kvaloy and Olsen, 2012). 
Resistance in this process domain is deemed more difficult because it focuses on altering forms of 
governance, for example by excluding spokespeople and redefining which actors can contribute to 
decision-making (Harrisson and Laberge, 2002; Greener, 2006). This epitomises Lukes’ second form 
of power which emphasises the marginalisation of dissenting voices or the ‘mobilization of bias’ in 
decisions to prevent opportunities for open conflict from arising in the first place (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963).  
Processual forms of power might sometimes be more difficult to resist than resource power, but both 
types risk encountering overt resistance. To overcome this, the powerful might seek to ‘shape the 
perceptions and beliefs of the subordinated so that they accept existing situation[s] and cannot imagine 
any alternative’ (Haran, 2010: 49). This power over meaning can change actors’ perceptions, both of 
their interests (through ideology), and their selves (through subjectification) (Fleming and Spicer, 
2014). In the realm of management ideas, this is evident through activities such as ‘thought leadership’ 
(e.g. research published by consultancies), training, lobbying and advertising (e.g. Starkey and Crane, 
2003). Here then, power can be seen not only as ‘sovereign’ – that is, in a Lukesian sense, as a 
possession of individuals or groups (either individually or collectively) - but also as an (often 
unintentional) effect. Resistance here is not always explicitly oppositional or even evident. Indeed, 
Lukes downplays resistance in this domain (2005: 131). However, resistance can clearly occur, as 
workers and decision-makers draw upon, and seek to assert, competing or alternative structures or 
ideologies (e.g. Thomas, 2005). Indeed, although we are emphasising power exercised by those in 
formal authority, this need not be the case. Moreover, resistance can also be seen as the exercise of 
power (Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998) in a relation of negative dialectics – power and control as 
‘mutually implicative and co-productive’ (Mumby, 2005: 3).  
This brief elaboration of Lukes helps illustrate the fact that ‘prior research has largely neglected how 
power constellations affect diffusion processes’ (Fiss and Zajac, 2004: 507; also, Swan and Scarbrough, 
2005: 920), and that where power is examined, it is often from only one perspective.  Given that the 
different forms of power we have outlined above are widely acknowledged in wider literature (e.g. 
Fleming and Spicer, 2014), these limitations curtail our understanding of the diffusion of management 
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ideas. In particular, they prompt further exploration of how these different forms of power manifest and 
interrelate when management ideas diffuse. 
 
Methodology 
The limitations of the literature suggest the need for a study in which a variety of forms of power can 
be explored in relation to management ideas. There are various possibilities, but we focused on one 
particular agent in this process - management consultancy - which is seen as a key ‘generator and 
distributor of new knowledge’ (Thrift, 2005: 35). In particular, its activities are pronounced in relation 
to promoting the adoption of ideas by others where power is especially visible (Anand et al., 2007). 
Thus, consultancy serves as an ‘extreme’ case (Blaikie, 2009). At the same time, it is a sector where 
research has not systematically examined power in multiple forms, especially not outside the immediate 
client-consultant project relationship (Nikolova, 2007). Two arguments then persuaded us to focus on 
one consultancy for our research: first, the value of in-depth case-studies in ‘unpicking the complexities 
of power’ (Ferner et al. 2012, p.182) and, second, the ability provide ample breadth without the need 
for multiple contextual introductions. To this end, we selected McKinsey, because it is, once again, an 
‘extreme’, cited as having had considerable influence across sectors and geographical areas (e.g. 
McKenna, 2006: 9). It has packaged and disseminated several management innovations such as the 
Multidivisional organisational form (M-form), corporate culture and process-engineering. More 
generally, as McDonald argued, ‘McKinsey’s ability to take an idea and “leverage” it up, using its brand 
and organizational effectiveness …. made its consultants far and away the most effective disseminators 
of ideas via the consulting process’ (McDonald, 2013, p289).  
In terms of data, the sensitivity of the conceptual focus (power) and context (consulting) combined with 
our broad empirical coverage led us to use publicly available sources. From inside McKinsey, this 
included: video footage from their conferences, reports and publications, publicity material, and public 
statements. Outside McKinsey, our data included: government publications; parliamentary transcripts; 
newspaper and magazine articles; television documentaries; research reports; request for information 
responses; court proceedings; blogs and websites from special interest groups; and a number of 
academic and non-academic histories, biographies and other analyses. The prominence of McKinsey in 
public sector reforms meant that many documents which, in the private sector would have been 
confidential, are often legally available for public scrutiny, offering researchers rare insights into a 
company famed for its secrecy. Overall, the variety of sources helped us piece together evidence about 
the company’s activities, but we should also stress that this still required considerable cross-referencing 
and caution.  
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An additional challenge was the extent to which we would focus on a particular management idea or 
seek to generalise. We chose an intermediate position of using vignettes. Vignettes are rich stories that 
help provide substance to an argument and help provide qualitative research with a ‘thickness’ (Sergi 
and Hallin, 2011), especially when considering power (Reed, 2012). They are suited to developing 
conceptual frameworks (e.g. Mantere and Vaara, 2008) and their selective and focused nature is useful 
in unpacking how things happen (e.g. Alvesson and Robertson, 2006). In line with our extreme case 
approach, we sought vignettes to illustrate a variety of forms of power, ideas and contexts. In each case, 
cognisant of some of the limitations of document-based data (Silverman, 2000), we tried to secure a 
range of different sources to limit our vulnerability to undue distortion that might arise from a single 
source.  
We initially explored six vignettes for which we felt there were adequate data. We eventually rejected 
the M-form structure and corporate culture because the specific role of McKinsey was difficult to 
isolate (c.f. Kipping and Westerhuis, 2014). By contrast, a study by Greenpeace (2011) which identified 
McKinsey as directly linked to deforestation, was deselected because of an insufficient quantity and 
diversity of sources. Ultimately, we chose one methods-based idea which applied across different 
sectors - the ‘war for talent’ which shaped recruitment practices in large organisations. The next idea – 
healthcare privatisation – was more diffuse, but sector specific. The final idea is not an idea that 
McKinsey commercialised, however, the very idea of what it is to be a professional consultant and 
manager has been strongly influenced by McKinsey. This highlights the role of consultancy as not just 
active disseminators of ideas, but as role models for them. Given that this also reveals much about 
McKinsey and how it operates more generally, we discuss it first and in greater detail, by way of a 
further consideration of the case.   
Our research design combined induction and abduction (Van Maanen et al., 2007). Analysis involved 
inducing themes about the types and effects of power that the vignettes revealed and comparing these 
across vignettes to reach generalisations about what ‘made a difference’. The next step was to seek a 
wider explanatory framework from the power literature which helped explain our findings (Danermark, 
2002). This abductive and iterative process settled on Lukes as the ‘best fit’. Our choice of Lukes as a 
conceptual framework was based partly on its multi-dimensional form, but it was by no means pre-
determined as other models were available. For example, we initially attempted to follow, but 
subsequently rejected, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan’s (1998) amendment of Lukes which adds a fourth, 
discursive, dimension of power. Our rejection was because their distinction between ‘meaning’ and 
‘discourse’ appeared confused and incompatible with our data. We also pursued, and rejected, several 
of our own theoretical modifications, for example, the use of different ‘emergent’ levels as an additional 
perspective. A final step involved re-examining the vignettes using Lukes and seeking opportunities to 
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develop his framework where we felt it did not fit easily with our findings – especially concerning 
temporal relations between types of power and unintended consequences. 
 
Vignettes 
1: The professional consultant / manager 
McKinsey & Co. was founded in 1926 to sell management engineering and accounting advice and 
techniques, but soon became influential in management consulting. The founder, James McKinsey, was 
President of the  American Accounting Association, a Professor at Chicago University, and had 
published several books on accounting with a managerial emphasis (David et al., 2013). His work 
establishing McKinsey was significantly extended by Marvin Bower, whom it is claimed, ‘virtually 
invented top management consulting’ (Edersheim 2010:3).   
Given the intangibility of much consulting and the early pursuit of occupational legitimacy, 
professionalisation is a theme in McKinsey’s history. McKenna for example notes how, mimicking 
more traditional professions, McKinsey ‘training emphasized professional language, professional 
metaphors, and professional comportment’ (2006: 204-5). Likewise, David et al. (2013: 369) show how 
McKinsey and a small number of other firms sought collectively to shape a professional body (the 
Association of Consulting Management Engineers, ACME) for the emerging industry. In the 1950s, 
they successfully crafted its code of ethics in an effort to resist alternative ‘high volume, low-cost’ 
approaches – ‘to keep the scoundrels out’ as Bower said (quoted in McKenna, 2006:213). As 
‘professional’ consulting  became institutionalised in terms of firm practices and partnership structures 
- as ‘corporate professionalism’ (Muzio et al., 2011) - the role of the ACME lessened (David et al, 
2013). However, the focus on professional identity remains strong at McKinsey, with today’s website 
for example, exhorting consultants to ‘Behave as professionals - uphold absolute integrity’. 
Debate continues as to what constitutes a professional, especially in consulting. This means that 
seemingly superficial features can be important (Kipping, 2011). This includes dress and appearance, 
and here, McKinsey is also considered as having been influential in setting the trend for a conservative 
dress code in the sector. In particular, Edersheim (2010: 71) lists black socks, blue suits and white shirts 
as well as, for a while, hats. The idea, he claims, was to mimic the dress of the high status clients they 
targeted. This was adopted by other leading firms such as IBM, but also consulting companies in post-
war USA. Together, they exported to their European consulting counterparts the ‘“McKinsey look of 
successful young professionals” (Kipping, 1999:215).  
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The explicit strategy, pursued from the 1950s, of recruiting young, relatively inexperienced, MBA 
graduates from Harvard and other elite universities also had aesthetic implications and lowered the 
median age of McKinsey consultants by ten years in a decade (Edersheim, 2010: 79). This was seen as 
especially innovative and successful such that ‘when copied by McKinsey and Company’s competitors, 
(it) led to the increasing homogenisation of management consulting in the early 1960s’ (McKenna, 
2006:158). Indeed, these images have proved both enduring and popular, reflected in media portrayals 
such as the television series about consultants, House of Lies (Carnahan, 2012). 
The ‘professional’ culture at McKinsey is also fostered by human resources policies which promote 
long hours (up to 100 a week) (Graef and Vale, 1999) and high performance goals. Recruitment, based 
around partner interviews and the ‘case interview’, seeks out those, not only with strong analytical 
skills, but also strong rhetorical and communication skills (Armbrüster, 2010). Once recruited, the 
consultants receive high levels of pay, training, mentoring by partners and continual feedback (Lemann, 
1999 : 215). They are also subject to an ‘up-or-out policy, with up to 80% of consultants leaving in the 
first five years (O’Shea and Madigan, 1997: 261), which not only ensures a steady stream of new 
recruits, but also a strong alumni network (Smets and Reihlen, 2012). Strong normative controls aim to 
ensure that the ‘McKinsey mind’ is maintained even after consultants have left (Raisel, 2003), an 
argument partially supported by the management styles and techniques of ex-McKinsey CEOs who use 
their methods (Haigh, 2003). 
McKinsey’s influence as regards others adopting its own practices does not stop at the consulting sector. 
The industry itself, and McKinsey in particular, has also been seen as important in shaping client firms 
and their managers. As McKenna observes: 
‘the organization and culture of the leading management consulting firms would exert a 
powerful influence on large-scale bureaucratic institutions as executives began increasingly 
to model their organizations after knowledge-based, team-led consultancies’ (2006:195) 
Such emulation is achieved through various channels, including MBA case-studies on McKinsey 
(Bartlett, 1996) and having their approach established as ‘best practice’ by their own literature (see 
vignette below). More directly, employing former consultants into managerial positions has been used 
as one way to instil ‘professional consulting’ orientations in non-consultancy organisations (Sturdy and 
Wright, 2008). Similarly, it was consultancies, especially McKinsey, that led the way for the dominance 
of the MBA graduate in senior management ranks in the USA and elsewhere. As Kipping notes: 
‘McKinsey - and the many other consulting firms which subsequently emulated its policies – did more 
to strengthen the underlying “elite professionalism”’ of a new professional class of general managers’ 
(2011:540).  
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It is, however, important not to overstate the influence of McKinsey on consulting and management. 
Firstly, there are other traditions of consulting which are not without significance, such as engineering 
or process consulting in the past, and emerging hybrid forms now (Christensen et al, 2013). Secondly, 
many of the practices adopted by the firm, such as the ‘up or out’ policy, recruiting young elite 
graduates, and even some of the consulting methods used, were taken from elsewhere, notably US law 
and accounting firms (McKenna, 2006; Bhide, 1995; Higdon, 1970) and also promoted by other 
consulting firms (David et al, 2013). In the former case then, McKinsey might be better seen as a 
recipient or intermediary in a wider process of promoting and adapting professional authority. Thirdly, 
the model of living for work and the ‘firm’ has come under scrutiny and resistance from those 
advocating and pursuing a ‘work-life balance’ (Whittle, 2008; Topconsultant, 2009). Fourthly, 
McKinsey’s profile sometimes attracts dissent within the sector and among clients. One client, quoted 
by Higdon (1969:145) in the 1960s stated, ‘I got the impression that people at McKinsey were very able 
people, but they didn’t have to keep telling me over and over again’.  
 
2: The War For Talent  
McKinsey adopts a ‘low leverage – low utilisation’ strategy (Maister, 2003) which allows consultants 
time to undertake ‘thought leadership’ activities such as best-practice surveys, which are then generated 
into reports or benchmarking tools for clients (Morris, 2001). One example of this is the ‘War for Talent’ 
surveys McKinsey undertook in 1997 and 2000. This work sought to explain how the ‘best performing 
companies’ managed their employees in a context of increasing demand for ‘excellent’ managers. The 
resulting reports (Chambers et al. 1998; Michaels et al. 2001) were published by Harvard Business 
Press, with whom McKinsey had strong institutional relations, and are replete with rhetorical flourishes 
(Fincham, 2002): the exultation of ‘A-players’ and ‘leaders’, and the use of biblical references 
suggesting the immorality of the lazy worker. Likewise, a militaristic tone informs many of the passages 
and evolutionist language celebrates the survival of the ‘fit’ and urges the rejection of the ‘unfit’. These 
references had resonance with, and contributed to a wider rhetoric concerning war, competition and 
fighting, which some argue, helped diffusion (Morris and Pinnington, 2002). As such, the War for 
Talent can be interpreted as a reinvention, or translation, of a much older ‘hard HRM’ or even Taylorist 
theme that has been in evidence for many decades. The general message in the book is that often young, 
inexperienced ‘A players’ should be highly rewarded and given free rein, whilst ‘C-Players’ should be 
managed (out) using an ‘iron hand in a velvet glove’ (Michaels et al., 2001: 140). Such rhetoric proved 
seemingly successful in a wider corporate climate of deregulation, privatisation and flatter 
organisations. At least, the very phrase ‘war for talent’ entered popular parlance as consultancies, 
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publishers, journalists and business schools incorporated the thinking into their products and 
publications (see SciVerse 1999-2012). 
For McKinsey, the reports were useful in generating services such as the ‘forced curve ranking system’ 
(FCRS). This was borrowed from several companies, including GE, that took a severe approach to 
‘poor’ performance and plotted employees’ performance on a bell-curve ‘with the lowly bottom 10% 
…being counselled or thrown out of their job’ (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006: 6). With the support of 
McKinsey consultants, the FCRS was implemented by the President of Enron Finance, Jeff Skilling (a 
McKinsey alumnus). As is now well documented, Enron, was replete with McKinsey consultants, 
projects and alumni (Sparrow and Cooper, 2012). Yet, the FCRS and the ‘talent mind-set’ in which it 
was embedded (Haigh 2003) were not welcomed by all. They were blamed for developing a culture 
which promoted a high-risk, money-orientated and aggressive culture which demotivated all but the 
most ‘successful’ employees (Salter, 2008). Despite the backlash, and the explicit critique of 
McKinsey’s HR advice (Gladwell, 2002), McKinsey felt no hesitation in announcing in 2008 that ‘the 
War for Talent never ended’ (Guthridge et al., 2008: 49) and its use and promotion of the term has 
continued (Beaverstock and Faulconbridge, 2009). Adaptations of the idea persist, such as morphing 
into a ‘talent crunch’ or ‘shortage’, and it was recently used to argue against the threat of immigration 
caps in the City of London. 
 
3: Healthcare privatisation  
Globally, healthcare consulting accounts for around 12% ($34bn) of consulting revenue (Kennedy 
Information, 2010). McKinsey is actively involved in this sector in three interrelated ways. Most 
conventionally, it carries out consulting projects for local hospitals to global suppliers. Secondly, it runs 
a number of ‘partnership institutes’ or ‘think-tanks’ such as the McKinsey Hospital Institute (MHI) in 
the UK. These undertake research, develop client networks and promote ideas and services which are 
often built around their own ‘products’ (e.g. the ‘MHI Framework’). For example, in the MHI’s Annual 
Summit for healthcare directors, McKinsey presented a number of strategic recommendations from 
their research. ‘Based on 139 million data-points’, these argued that ‘winners’ do ‘five 
things…differently or better than the losers’ - all of which McKinsey has tools to support (Roy, 2013). 
Thirdly, and our focus here, McKinsey plays a central role in the promotion of a particular policy 
position on healthcare - its privatisation and/or deregulation. We now briefly look at an example of this 
from the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK.  
Actively pursued by UK governments, the introduction of competition, private suppliers and ‘choice’ 
to the NHS was initiated with support from McKinsey (2009). This involved strategic advice including 
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to ‘challenge the principle that the NHS is free at the point of delivery’ (McKinsey & Co., 2009), 
participating in the design of strategy documents, and helping shape legislation (Rose, 2012). In 
addition, the consultancy advises many of the UK’s local healthcare organisations (NHS Trusts), 
facilitates meetings between private healthcare providers and the government’s Department of Health, 
and received a contract to develop the NHS leadership team (Rose 2012).  
Yet it is not McKinsey’s involvement with the NHS that has provoked most media attention in the UK, 
but with Monitor, the regulator of NHS Trusts. McKinsey designed Monitor’s organisational structure 
and audits its plans and performance (Hansard, 2012 13th February). In addition, the Chairman of 
Monitor, David Becket, was a Director at McKinsey and is just one of many who have moved from 
McKinsey into government, NHS or Monitor roles or vice versa. In addition, there are ‘free’ advisors 
and secondees that McKinsey provides to government departments and influential think-tanks that have 
pushed the privatisation agenda (Player and Leys, 2012). The press has also noted McKinsey paying 
for after-dinner speeches, dinners, flights and entertainment for key decision makers in the NHS and 
Monitor (Duckworth, 2012). 
However, there are limits to McKinsey’s influence, partly arising from the scrutiny and media attention 
it attracts. Specific concerns were raised in parliament that ‘McKinsey seems to be setting the rules of 
the game in relation to the Government's health Bill and then benefiting from the outcome’ (Hansard, 
2012 13th February). Similarly, in a submission to parliament concerning conflicts of interest, 
Spinwatch – a UK non-profit company - has an appendix dedicated to McKinsey. Moreover, the press 
and media coverage of consultants in the NHS, often McKinsey specifically, has been used by patient 
groups such as ‘False Economy’ and ‘Keep our NHS Public’. Such contestation has continued, leading 
to the translation of privatisation agendas towards hybrid forms of governance and care. 
 
Power and resistance in the diffusion of management ideas 
The vignettes above illustrate some of the management ideas that McKinsey has been involved in 
shaping and disseminating and how this is pursued, to a large extent, outside specific consulting 
projects. In this section, we analyse the forms of power and resistance which underpin these processes 
using Lukes’ framework (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 McKinsey’s power and management ideas  
 Resource  Process Meaning Resistance 
Healthcare 
privatisation 
Networks of clients & politicians for surveys 
and summits.  
Financial and human resources to fund Kings 
Fund, chair summit, analyse data and 
network. 
 
Revolving doors: 
government & think tanks. 
Using inside knowledge to 
lever work and persuade 
clients. 
Using conferences, 
sponsored talks & networks 
to gain the ‘valuable time’ of 
CEOs and exclude others 
Reproducing ‘neo-liberal’ or positivist 
ideologies (e.g. ‘139 million data 
points’). 
Promotion of ‘right wing’ healthcare 
institutes. 
Exposure of potential conflicts of interest 
by press & parliament. 
Competing providers for strategy work. 
Rules on revolving doors 
Alternative ideologies: e.g. public service  
Translation into hybrid forms of 
governance 
The war for 
talent and 
FCRS 
Finance for operating McKinsey Global 
Institute. 
Time available for research, data analysis, 
writing and networking. 
Network access to GE and other clients and 
with Harvard for book publishing. 
Privileged access e.g. Enron. 
 
Rhetoric: evolution, religion, sport, 
military & performance management. 
Legitimacy through links with Harvard 
Business School Press. 
 
Disclosures following Enron collapse. 
Translation & competing management 
ideas (‘talent crunch’) 
Counter-ideologies: e.g. ethics  
Public critique (e.g. Gladwell) 
Reputational damage (Enron) 
Professional 
consultant 
 
Finance for recruitment, training, salaries 
and ‘elite’ lifestyle.  
Rules to enforce dress-codes etc. 
Network resources to occupy client roles and 
recruit from ‘elite’ schools.  
Time for partner contact and continual 
assessment. 
Network to secure credibility by association 
with elite institutions (e.g. ACME). 
Skills/knowledge in networking, persuasion 
and analysis. 
Targeted recruitment at 
universities / MBAs. 
Gatekeeping and agenda 
setting of industry body to 
exclude ‘non-professional’ 
firms. 
Non-participation in 
individual-, non-firm based 
professional bodies.  
 
Institutionalisation of ‘professional’ 
consulting and ‘best practice’ through 
thought leadership, case-studies, books 
etc. 
Brand mystique and no advertising 
create ambiguity. 
Strong firm culture controls exerted, 
including norm of ‘professional 
consultant’. 
Association with high profile 
brands/symbols (e.g. universities, USA) 
to construct and legitimate position (e.g. 
in post-war Europe). 
Construction as elitist / arrogant by 
clients, peers and the press. 
Singling out of McKinsey by critical 
politicians, academics and press. 
Alternative models of consultancy e.g. 
professional associations and 
implementation firms. 
Alternative ideas e.g. work-life balance. 
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Power of Resources  
Taking Lukes’ first type of power, McKinsey’s various resources provide support for their role in the 
creation, translation and dissemination of management ideas. Firstly, financial resources enable the low 
leverage ratios required for research, the salaries for the recruitment of ex-ministers, high quality 
facilities for NHS meetings, donations to the Conservative Party, payment for speeches, the support of 
health think-tanks, and the publication of reports. The financial resources of McKinsey also facilitate 
the recruitment and development of analytically and rhetorically skilled staff who help create products 
and achieve board-level sales. As others have pointed out (McKenna, 2006; Bock, 2014) these resources 
are not simply concerned with competence in business operations and sales, but also the ‘cultural 
capital’ which generates images of elitism which often attracts clients, recruits and other stakeholders.  
A related resource that McKinsey exploits is its networks, developed through board-level projects, 
alumni contacts and relationships with senior decision-makers. As we saw in the War for Talent and 
the Healthcare cases, these also allow McKinsey to gather information from senior decision-makers 
thereby making their products seem more targeted and their ideas seem more legitimate (Kipping and 
Westerhuis, 2014). Networks with non-client organisations such as Harvard Business Press add 
credibility, whilst others, such as those with think-tanks, position McKinsey well to influence client 
agendas. These social-business networks, whilst founded in part on financial resources, also potentially 
generate and are fuelled by reputational capital among graduates, clients and the wider public. Thus, 
McKinsey’s association with stakeholders can create an elite image which in turn can impress recruits, 
clients and competitors (Alvesson and Robertson, 2006; Armbrüster, 2010).  
Thus, we can see how financial, network and human resources interrelate with knowledge resources or 
expertise. The ‘139 million data points’, the access to ‘best practice’ companies and the inside 
knowledge of what new policy decisions are being made by governments, all point to a form of expertise 
or knowledge capital (Braunerhjelm, 2000) which often makes McKinsey attractive to clients 
(Nikolova, 2007). Yet, McKinsey’s resource power is limited in that it does not permit it to impose its 
ideas on others. Clients and other stakeholders can ‘resist’ on the basis of competing resources, such as 
their legitimate authority to choose other advisors (e.g. internal consultants or academics) (Hislop, 
2002). Moreover, we can see how some of McKinsey’s ideas such as the war for talent and the idea of 
the professional consultant have been translated into different contexts, either as a form of resistance or 
as an unintended consequence of local implementations (Czarniawska-Joerges and Sevón, 1996). 
In a broader sense too, it is important to highlight how McKinsey’s resource-based powers, such as 
those used to implement the ‘up or out’ policy and the ability to persuade decision-makers, are enabled 
and constrained by a particular contingent legislative and normative environment. For example, a trend 
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in ‘professional’ procurement limits the extent to which consultants can actually communicate with 
(and thereby persuade) decision-makers (Furusten and Werr, 2005). Resistance, seen from this 
perspective, is the power of legislators and others to change the practices of consultancies. Yet, as we 
see next, McKinsey also seeks to exert power over these very decision-making processes in order to 
prevent such activities occurring. 
 
Power of Process  
In our vignettes we can point to McKinsey’s influence on the decision-making processes of potential 
buyers by excluding competitors. One method of achieving this is to try to ensure that potential clients 
already have the ‘McKinsey Mind’ or at least sympathies (Raisel 2003). The ‘revolving doors’ in the 
healthcare vignette or the role of Skilling at Enron are good examples of how this bias mobilisation 
could lean decision-makers towards McKinsey solutions. Such an advantage need not necessarily 
involve a conscious bias, but might simply be based upon the proximity of McKinsey contacts compared 
to those of other consultancies (Sturdy et al, 2009).   
A more explicit practice might be seen in the NHS vignette, where McKinsey helped draw up policies 
which influenced future consultancy purchasing decisions. This not only ensures that McKinsey is seen 
as a source of information on future opportunities (e.g. of sales opportunities to US Healthcare 
providers), but also positions McKinsey to benefit from future purchases of its own services (Rose, 
2012). As others have argued more generally, the very language in which such ‘framework’ policies 
are couched can influence the decision regarding which firm is most likely to win (Furusten and Werr, 
2005).  
Another manifestation of this form of power is the occupation of the ‘space’ of the decision-maker. 
Here, the geographic and temporal presence of McKinsey may mean that alternative sources of advice 
are squeezed out of the field of attention of decision-makers. There are only so many conferences, talks 
and reports to which senior decision-makers can give their attention. The success of McKinsey in 
running the MHI Conference for instance, means that other voices are necessarily minimised. This also 
allows McKinsey to act informally as ‘spokesperson’ for diverse voices within health, which as Callon 
and Latour have noted, allows an institutionalisation and legitimation of power relations (Callon, 1986). 
To take another example, the presence of McKinsey secondees on government boards which have 
limited membership, helps prevent the access of those that might provide other types of advice. Similar 
arguments can be made with regard to the recruitment of consultants from elite universities and business 
schools with the effect that, not only are other employers effectively excluded, but also other ‘minority’ 
types of recruit do not come to make up ‘professional’ consulting. 
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Finally, McKinsey can be seen to influence the process of decision-making by withholding 
participation. For example, we saw how it initially joined forces with other elite firms to exclude and 
discredit the ‘high volume, low-cost’ approach to consulting (Higdon, 1969). However, having secured 
its own dominance and that of the professional form of consulting, McKinsey has avoided engagement 
with professional associations who might offer a competing source of power over ‘best practice’ (David 
et al, 2013). This withdrawal of support in favour of corporate professionalism has a serious effect on 
the legitimacy and power of such institutions, for example, undermining attempts at compulsory 
professional accreditation for consultants (Muzio et al, 2011). Such abstinence has an effect not only 
on the idea of what it is to be a legitimate consultant, but how such ideas are promoted.  
As with resources, the exercise of processual power is subject to constraints and resistance. ‘Revolving 
door’ activity is subject to some formal controls which, in the UK for example, mandate a waiting 
period between moving from government to private sectors. Moreover, conflicts of interest are often 
highlighted by the press, documentary makers, ministers and watchdogs (e.g. Graef and Vale, 1999). 
As we have seen, a more legislative approach has been taken to prevent consulting companies 
interfering with decision-making through procurement regulations, which partners in consultancies 
describe as a strategic challenge (O'Mahoney et al., 2008). Moreover, the promotion of the professional 
model of the consultant through a strategy of abstinence from formal institutions has been resisted 
through an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to have compulsory accreditation of consultants in 
Germany (Groß, 2004) and by professional associations increasingly extending their individual 
accreditation to MBAs and firms’ staff. Similarly, McKinsey’s early attempts to exclude and discredit 
other forms of consulting were only partially successful and new approaches continue to emerge, 
including those which adapt the McKinsey model (Christensen et al., 2013). 
 
Power of Meaning 
The shaping of meaning by McKinsey is more difficult to establish, but is suggested in two ways 
through the vignettes. The first is a direct and explicit attempt to shape wants by defining problems and 
suggesting solutions, most explicitly through ‘thought leadership’. This can be seen in the War for 
Talent research and the MHI videos, all of which see McKinsey identifying (or creating) a variety of 
issues and proffering solutions based upon imitating what other ‘winners’ are doing. Such is the 
reputation of McKinsey among some clients, publishers and business schools that any activity it 
promotes can have mimetic effects. For example, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) classic work on 
isomorphism is based on observations of McKinsey interventions being imitated (Armbruster, 2006: 7). 
Interestingly, the most obvious strategy in shaping meanings in corporate contexts, advertising, is 
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something that McKinsey actively avoids in favour of less direct branding in the form of sponsorship, 
prizes, pro-bono work and publications (McDonald, 2013). Such an approach creates a mystique which 
is a recognised strategy of ‘quality’ brands in other sectors (Kapferer and Bastien, 2012) and one which 
can play an important role in the diffusion of management ideas, especially given the ambiguity over 
their effectiveness (Giroux, 2006). 
A second construction of meaning occurs when McKinsey itself is seen as a manifestation of wider 
norms or structures. Indeed, the meaning of ‘McKinsey’, or even ‘consultancy’ and ‘professionalism’ 
for that matter, is as much dependent on wider socio-economic forces as it is on anything that McKinsey 
might control directly. For example, the diffusion of McKinsey ideas into post-war Europe can be seen 
in part as due to its association with the USA as a force for modernisation (Kipping, 1999). Similarly, 
its own adoption of the partnership organisational structure is, in part, because such an approach already 
had legitimacy among clients (McKenna, 2006). Moreover, the very language that McKinsey uses, 
strategically or otherwise, fits with wider meanings - not just phrases such as ‘talent’, ‘war’, or 
‘winners’, but also the contextualisation of their practices within legitimised military, scientific, 
biblical, gaming or neo-liberal ideas. This is not surprising given that successful rhetoric depends on a 
wider resonance (Grint and Case, 1998).  
Resistance to the shaping of wants can paradoxically serve to reproduce power relations (Fleming and 
Spicer 2014). In this context for example, popular critiques of consultancy power and practices can be 
self-defeating (Sturdy, 2009). The presentation of consultants as lying, manipulative egotists in House 
of Lies or the specification of McKinsey consultants as ‘arrogant’ can add to their mystique of being all 
powerful (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Yet resistance to hegemonic power occurs because McKinsey 
and its supportive structures are not all powerful. Competing ideas of accountability, bureaucracy and 
public service continue to be leveraged within the NHS for example. Indeed, McKinsey itself does not 
have complete control over its own local constructions – for example, it might be expected that the 
meanings associated with ‘McKinsey’ in the minds of clients or graduates might be challenged by, or 
translated through, the criticism it has received in the press or parliament, or indeed through their own 
experiences of working with the firm. 
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The temporal relations of power and resistance 
Through our vignettes, we have sought to illustrate the effects of different types of power in the 
diffusion of management ideas in order to address the neglected or singular treatment of power in the 
extant literature. However, doing so raises new questions concerning, for example, the relationship 
between the types of power. Lukes acknowledges, but says very little about this (2005: 38-48). Yet,  we 
can begin to identify patterns. For example, in our data, most displays of resource power also entail 
power over meaning through their symbolic consequences. This is evident in how the use of financial 
resources to recruit ‘high calibre’ graduates has symbolic and signalling effects on clients (Armbrüster, 
2010). Indeed, it is difficult to think of a process or meaning-based exercise of power that does not 
imply using some of the resources we have outlined. Conversely, it is hard to imagine a resource-based 
exercise of power concerning idea diffusion that requires either a process- or meaning-based exercise 
of power. Such an argument develops a suggestion by Ferner et al. (2012:166) that ‘the power of 
meaning is built upon the resource power that derives from the primary economic activity of the firm’. 
Moreover, some forms of meaning power also require process power. For example, the ability 
effectively to deploy effective legitimating ideas (meaning) requires a position by which one’s voice is 
heard (process) and often the use of finances, connections or expertise to achieve such positioning. Yet, 
the opposite is not so much in evidence. One can think of many examples of process power (for example 
excluding others from professional associations) which require resource power, but do not require 
(though might create) power over meaning.  
To this end, we could posit a model in which there is a major dependency of both process and meaning 
power on resource power and a (potential) minor dependency in the opposite direction. We could also 
suggest that this is true for both those exerting power directly and those using power as resistance. So, 
for example, those who promote alternative approaches or positions, such as accountability in the NHS, 
require, say, material and network resources, whilst clients who exercise their potential power and just 
say ‘no’ to McKinsey need little more than (market-based) resource power. However, some caution is 
needed in claiming hierarchical relationships between power dimensions. For example, while resource 
power may now provide a basis by which other forms of power may be exerted, and thus reproduced, 
it does not answer the question of how that power came about in the first place. In 1926, James 
McKinsey possessed some resource power (money, a network, and expertise), but nothing like that 
which McKinsey & Co. now deploys, so a claim that resource power underpins all forms of power 
cannot be sustained temporally. To help undo this knot, we might propose that agency can (often 
unexpectedly) create the conditions for potential gains in power in a changing and relatively 
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unpredictable social context1. In other words, in an open social system, the deployment of any form of 
power is a contingent and complex gamble which may bring, but does not guarantee, a ‘return on 
investment’. Thus, and following Edwards’ (2006) assessment of Lukes’ revised model, it is important 
to identify power as operating dynamically within particular temporal contexts and as situationally 
specific. 
The unintended consequences of the exercise of power are discounted by Lukes as not ‘counting’ as 
power (2005: 53), but are important in our study because acknowledging that an exercise of power (or 
resistance) need not be predictable (and thus potentially figuring in the calculations of an agent) helps 
move us away from a conceptualisation of power as sovereign i.e. held by a singular entity. Thus, the 
collapse of Enron whilst unpredictable and unplanned, did harm to McKinsey’s reputation (Byrne, 
2002). Therefore, we would argue, analyses should account for the diffuse and networked forms of 
power and resistance that are important, if not predictable.  
Acknowledging the unpredictable consequences of power and resistance is also important because it 
highlights how different forms of power can be related: for example, a consultant may draw upon 
McKinsey’s resource power to implement a project in the NHS, but may not intend for (or think about) 
this agency to exert process or meaning power that might reproduce neo-liberal ideology. The 
specification of this unintended and different form of power helps place responsibility on that individual 
for the implications of their actions. Resistance as reproducing power is a theme in Fleming and Spicer 
(2014), but a multi-dimensional view of power also allows that successful resistance at one level (e.g. 
resources) may reproduce a different form of power (e.g. meaning). For example, some forms of 
resistance (such as this paper perhaps) may accidentally serve to raise the profile of McKinsey as an 
influential agent, thus rendering it more attractive to some graduates and clients. 
Collectively, these points also emphasise the temporal dynamics inherent in power-resistance relations. 
This concerns first a power-resistance dialectic which can be traced in McKinsey’s responses to 
resistance against idea diffusion. For example, when clients began pushing back against paying for 
young, MBA graduates, McKinsey changed its strategy to recruit more experienced, older hires. 
Second, we can trace the institutionalisation of some effects of power whereby, what was once seen as 
controversial, for example, the acceptance of consultants in government work, becomes more accepted 
as resistance fails or has limited effects. This process of institutionalisation appears to involve resource, 
process and meaning power together: as time passes, the activity becomes less controversial, thus both 
                                                     
1 We are grateful for one of the anonymous reviewers for this point 
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legitimating it and de-legitimating alternatives, whilst at the same time providing additional resources 
(for example, expertise, revenue or relationships). From this perspective, resistance is not simply a 
reaction against a current exercise of power, but also against the future institutionalisation of 
management ideas. 
 
Conclusion 
By using an adapted form of Lukes’ framework of power to analyse the activities of McKinsey, this 
paper has sought to show how management idea diffusion and translation are enabled and constrained 
by the exercise of different forms of power. We saw how McKinsey drew upon diverse resources and 
sought to influence decision-making processes to place their ideas in a preferential position, and shaped 
the meanings and ‘wants’ associated with their ideas both directly and indirectly. In addition, forms of 
resistance and translation were also identified for each idea and framing of power. These illustrations 
are important in relation to management ideas and knowledge more generally for four reasons. First, 
they address prior neglect of power, both generally, but especially in a way which moves beyond the 
singular approach that many studies take. Second, we began to reveal some of the relationships and 
dynamics between different forms of power, arguing that empirically they can seem diffuse, but that 
hierarchical and circular relations are possible, but by no means pre-determined. Thirdly, at an empirical 
level, we have shown that McKinsey - commonly depicted as almost omnipotent - is also significantly 
constrained, for example, by individual actors (e.g. clients) as well as wider institutions (e.g. competing 
ideologies and regulation). At the same time, in the context of the literature on consulting and 
management ideas, our illustrations move the depiction of power beyond that of a simple struggle 
between consultant and client within the context of specific projects. Fourthly, at a more general level, 
we have responded to repeated calls to re-engage with issues of power within organisation studies 
(Spicer et al., 2009; Fournier and Grey, 2000; Prichard and Mir, 2010; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010) and 
done so in a way which connects to an issue of wider policy relevance – the role of consultants in 
shaping our lives.  
Our analysis, combined with the scope and limitations of our study present various avenues for further 
research. Our focus on McKinsey used public sources and was selected as an extreme case. This allowed 
a breadth of coverage, but using primary data might help better establish links between the promotion 
and adoption of ideas. It could offer additional insights, for example, in considering how strategic the 
use of power is in the decision-making of key agents. Likewise, studying consultants who are less 
renowned for their power would provide a counterbalance to our high profile case. In addition, we 
focused on the consulting industry – a sector which is relatively new, concentrated and (comparatively) 
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unconstrained by unions, institutions and the law. It would be useful therefore, to see how generalisable 
our findings are to environments which are more rule bound, such as the public sector and regulated 
occupations. Finally, we pointed to the possible relationships between types of power and how they 
might vary according to context - thus larger and comparative studies are also needed, including those 
which acknowledge international contexts. Likewise, although we have pointed to a wider role of 
McKinsey in reproducing the ideologies and structures of capitalism such as neo-liberalism, we believe 
there is more empirical work to be done in contextualising consulting and other agents of management 
ideas within the wider transnational capitalist context and in detailing practices of resistance at this level 
(Seabrooke, 2014).  
 
  
21 
 
References 
Alvesson M and Robertson M. (2006) The Best and the Brightest: The Construction, Significance and 
Effects of Elite Identities in Consulting Firms. Organization 13: 195-224. 
Anand N, Gardner HK and Morris T. (2007) Knowledge-based innovation: emergence and embedding 
of new practice areas in management consulting firms. Academy of Management Journal 50: 
406-428. 
Armbrüster T. (2010) The Economics and Sociology of Management Consulting: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bachrach P and Baratz MS. (1963) Decisions and nondecisions: An analytical framework. American 
political science review 57: 632-642. 
Bartlett C. (1996) McKinsey & Company: Managing knowledge and learning, Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Beaverstock JV and Faulconbridge JR. (2009) Official’ and ‘unofficial’ measurements of international 
business travel to and from the UK : trends, patterns and limitations. . In: Beaverstock JD, B., 
Faulconbridge, J.; Witlox, F. (ed) International business travel in the global economy. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 57-84. 
Bhide AV. (1995) 'Building the professional firm: McKinsey and Co.: 1939–1968', Boston: HBR. 
Birkinshaw J, Hamel G and Mol MJ. (2008) Management innovation. Academy of Management Review 
33: 825-845. 
Blaikie N. (2009) Designing Social Research: Wiley. 
Bloomfield B and Best A. (1992) Management consultants: systems development, power and the 
translation of problems. Sociological Review 40: 533-560. 
Bock S. (2014) Politicized expertise–an analysis of the political dimensions of consultants' policy 
recommendations to developing countries with a case study of McKinsey's advice on REDD+ 
policies. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 27: 379-397. 
Bradshaw A. (1976) A Critique of Steven Lukes'Power: A Radical View'. Sociology 10: 121-127. 
Braunerhjelm P. (2000) Knowledge Capital and the "New Economy": Firm Size, Performance And 
Network Production: Kluwer Academic. 
Byrne J. (2002) Inside McKinsey. Business Week. NYC: Bloomberg. 
Callon M. (1986) Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the 
Fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay. In: Law J (ed) Power, Action and Belief: a new Sociology of 
Knowledge? Sociological Review Monograph. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 196-233. 
Carnahan M. (2012) House of Lies. 
Christensen CM, Wang D and van Bever D. (2013) Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption. Harvard 
business review: 106-115. 
Courpasson D, Golsorkhi D and Sallaz JJ. (2012) Rethinking Power in Organizations, Institutions, and 
Markets: Emerald. 
Czarniawska-Joerges B and Sevón G. (1996) Translating Organizational Change: Walter de Gruyter. 
Danermark B. (2002) Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences: Routledge. 
22 
 
David RJ, Sine WD and Haveman HA. (2013) Seizing opportunity in emerging fields: How institutional 
entrepreneurs legitimated the professional form of management consulting. Organization 
Science 24: 356-377. 
Delbridge R, Turnbull P and Wilkinson B. (2007) Pushing back the frontiers: management control and 
work intensification under JIT/TQM factory regimes. New Technology, work and employment 
7: 97-106. 
DiMaggio PJ and Powell WW. (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review: 147-160. 
Duckworth R. (2012) Private consultants reap rewards from UK NHS Privatisation. 
Edersheim EH. (2010) McKinsey's Marvin Bower: Vision, Leadership, and the Creation of 
Management Consulting: Wiley. 
Edwards P. (2006) Power and ideology in the workplace going beyond even the second version of the 
three-dimensional view. Work, Employment & Society 20: 571-581. 
Ferner A, Edwards T and Tempel A. (2012) Power, institutions and the cross-national transfer of 
employment practices in multinationals. Human Relations 65: 163-187. 
Fincham R. (2002) Charisma versus technique: differentiating the expertise of management gurus and 
management consultants. In: Clark T and Fincham R (eds) Critical Consulting: New 
Perspectives on the Management Advice Industry. . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 191-205. 
Fiss PC and Zajac EJ. (2004) The diffusion of ideas over contested terrain: The (non) adoption of a 
shareholder value orientation among German firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 49: 501-
534. 
Fleming P and Spicer A. (2014) Organizational Power in Management and Organization Science. The 
Academy of Management Annals: 1-73. 
Fournier V and Grey C. (2000) At the Critical Moment: Conditions and Prospects for Critical 
Management Studies. Human Relations 53: 7-32. 
Frenkel M. (2005) The politics of translation: How state-level political relations affect the cross-national 
travel of management ideas. Organization 12: 275-301. 
Fu X. (2012) Foreign Direct Investment and managerial knowledge spillovers through the diffusion of 
management practices. Journal of Management Studies 49: 970-999. 
Furusten S and Werr A. (2005) Dealing with confidence: the construction of need and trust in 
management ... 269. 
Giroux H. (2006) ‘It Was Such a Handy Term’: Management Fashions and Pragmatic Ambiguity. 
Journal of Management Studies 43: 1227-1260. 
Gladwell M. (2002) The Talent Myth. The New Yorker. New York. 
Gordon RD. (2005) An empirical investigation into the power behind empowerment. Organization 
Management Journal 2: 144-165. 
Graef R and Vale J. (1999) Masters of the Universe. London: Channel4 Films. 
Greener I. (2006) Nick Leeson and the Collapse of Barings Bank: Socio-Technical Networks and the 
'Rogue Trader'. Organization 13: 421-441. 
Greenpeace. (2011) Bad Influence: How McKinsey inspired plans lead to rainforest destruction. 
Amsterdam, 1-40. 
23 
 
Grint K and Case P. (1998) The Violent Rhetoric of Re-engineering: Management Consultancy on the 
Offensive. Journal of Management Studies 35: 557-577. 
Groß C. (2004) Ar e Consultants Moving towar d Professionalization? 
Guthridge M, Komm A and Lawson E. (2008) Making talent a strategic priority: War for Talent never 
ended. Executives must constantly rethink the way their companies plan to attract, motivate, 
and retain employees. The McKinsey Quarterly, Jg 45: 49-59. 
Haigh G. (2003) Bad Company: The Cult of the CEO: Black Inc. 
Hansard. (2012 13th February) House of Lords Report Column 545. 
Haran N. (2010) The Power to Collaborate: Eburon. 
Hardy C and Leiba-O'Sullivan S. (1998) The Power Behind Empowerment: Implications for Research 
and Practice. Human Relations 51: 451-483. 
Harrisson D and Laberge M. (2002) Innovation, identities and resistance: The social construction of an 
innovation network. Journal of Management Studies 39: 497-521. 
Higdon H. (1970) The business healers: Random House. 
Hislop D. (2002) The client role in consultancy relations during the appropriation of technological 
innovations. Research Policy 31: 657-671. 
Ibarra H. (1993) Network centrality, power, and innovation involvement: Determinants of technical and 
administrative roles. Academy of Management Journal 36: 471-501. 
Kapferer JN and Bastien V. (2012) The Luxury Strategy: Break the Rules of Marketing to Build Luxury 
Brands: Kogan Page. 
Kennedy Information. (2010) Global and US Trends in Management Consulting A Kennedy 
Information Perspective. New York, 1-6. 
Kipping M. (1999) American management consulting companies in Western Europe, 1920 to 1990: 
Products, reputation, and relationships. Business History Review 73: 190-220. 
Kipping M. (2011) Hollow from the start? Image professionalism in management consulting. Current 
Sociology 59: 530-550. 
Kipping M and Westerhuis G. (2014) The managerialization of banking: from blueprint to reality. 
Management & Organizational History: 1-20. 
Kostova T and Roth K. (2002) Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations. Academy of Management Journal 45: 215-233. 
Kvaloy O and Olsen TE. (2012) Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality. Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 21: 493-518. 
Latour B. (1986) The powers of association. In: Law J (ed) Power; action and belief: A new sociology 
of knowledge. . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Lemann N. (1999 ) The kids in the conference room: How McKinsey & Company became the next big 
step The New Yorker. New York, 209-216. 
Lukes S. (1974) Power: a radical view, London: McMillan. 
Lukes S. (2005) Power: a radical view: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Maister DH. (2003) Managing The Professional Service Firm: Simon & Schuster UK. 
24 
 
Mantere S and Vaara E. (2008) On the Problem of Participation in Strategy: A Critical Discursive 
Perspective. Organization Science 19: 341-358. 
Mazza C and Pedersen JS. (2004) From Press to E-Media? The Transformation of an Organizational 
Field. Organization Studies 25: 875-896. 
McCabe D, Knights D, Kerfoot D, et al. (1998) Making sense of" quality?"-toward a review and critique 
of quality initiatives in financial services. Human Relations 51: 389-411. 
McDonald D. (2013) The Firm: The Story of McKinsey and Its Secret Influence on American Business, 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
McKenna CD. (2006) The World's Newest Profession: Management Consulting in the Twentieth 
Century: Cambridge University Press. 
McKinsey & Co. (2009) Achieving World Class Productivity in the NHS. London: McKinsey & Co. 
Michaels E, Handfield-Jones H and Axelrod B. (2001) War For Talent, Boston: Harvard Business 
Press. 
Morris T. (2001) Asserting property rights: Knowledge codification in the professional service firm. 
Human Relations 54: 819-838. 
Morris T and Pinnington A. (2002) Beyond the War for Talent Hype: Occupational and Organisational 
Change in the Business Professions. In: Clegg  S (ed) Management and Organization 
Paradoxes. Advances in Organization Studies London: John Benjamin Publishing Company. 
Mueller F and Whittle A. (2011) Translating Management Ideas: A Discursive Devices Analysis. 
Organization Studies 32: 187-210. 
Mumby DK. (2005) Theorizing Resistance in Organization Studies: A Dialectical Approach. 
Management Communication Quarterly 19: 19-44. 
Muzio D, Hodgson D, Faulconbridge J, et al. (2011) Towards corporate professionalization: The case 
of project management, management consultancy and executive search. Current Sociology 59: 
443-464. 
Nikolova N. (2007) The Client-Consultant Relationship in Professional Business Service Firms, 
Cologne: Kolner Wissenschaftsverlag. 
O'Mahoney J, Adams R and Neely A. (2008) A Scoping Study of Contemporary and Future Challenges 
in the UK Management Consulting Industry. . London: Advanced Institute of Management. 
Orlikowski WJ. (2002) Knowing in Practice: Enacting a Collective Capability in Distributed 
Organizing. Organization Science 13: 249-273. 
Pfeffer J and Sutton RI. (2006) Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-truths, and Total Nonsense: Profiting from 
Evidence-based Management: Harvard Business School Press. 
Player S and Leys C. (2012) McKinsey’s unhealthy profits. Red Pepper. London: Red Pepper, 2-4. 
Prichard C and Mir R. (2010) Editorial: Organizing value. Organization 17: 507-515. 
Raisel E. (2003) The Mckinsey Mind: McGraw-Hill Education (India) Pvt Limited. 
Reed MI. (2012) Masters of the universe: Power and elites in organization studies. Organization Studies 
33: 203-221. 
Rogers EM. (1995) Diffusion of innovations, New York: Free Press. 
Rose D. (2012) The firm that Hijacked the NHS. Daily Mail. London. 
Roy S. (2013) McKinsey Hospital Institute Summit 2013. 
25 
 
Salter MS. (2008) Innovation Corrupted: The Origins and Legacy of Enron's Collapse. 525. 
Seabrooke L. (2014) Epistemic arbitrage: Transnational professional knowledge in action. Journal of 
Professions and Organization 1: 49-64. 
Sergi V and Hallin A. (2011) Thick performances, not just thick descriptions: the processual nature of 
doing qualitative research. Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management 6: 191-
208. 
Smets M and Reihlen M. (2012) Institutional entrepreneurship: a literature review and analysis of the 
maturing consulting field. In: Reihlen M and Werr A (eds) Handbook of Research on 
Entrepreneurship in Professional Services. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Sparrow P and Cooper CL. (2012) The Employment Relationship: Key Challenges for HR: Taylor & 
Francis. 
Spicer a, Alvesson M and Karreman D. (2009) Critical performativity: The unfinished business of 
critical management studies. Human Relations 62: 537-560. 
Starkey K and Crane A. (2003) Toward Green Narrative: Management and the Evolutionary Epic. 
Academy of Management Review 28: 220-237. 
Sturdy A. (2004) The Adoption of Management Ideas and Practices Theoretical Perspectives and 
Possibilities. Management Learning 35: 155-179. 
Sturdy A. (2009) Popular critiques of consultancy and a politics of management learning? Management 
Learning 40: 457-463. 
Sturdy A and Wright C. (2008) A Consulting Diaspora? Enterprising Selves as Agents of Enterprise. 
Organization 15: 427-444. 
Swan J and Scarbrough H. (2005) The politics of networked innovation. Human Relations 58: 913-943. 
Thomas R. (2005) Theorizing the micro-Politics of resistance: new public management and managerial 
identities in the uk public services. Organization Studies 26: 683-706. 
Thrift N. (2005) Knowing capitalism: Sage Publications Limited. 
Topconsultant. (2009) Quitting McKinsey for a better work-Life balance. 
Van Maanen J, Sørensen JB and Mitchell TR. (2007) The Interplay Between Theory and Method. 
Academy of Management Review 32: 1145-1154. 
van Veen K, Bezemer J and Karsten L. (2011) Diffusion, translation and the neglected role of managers 
in the fashion setting process: The case of MANS. Management Learning 42: 149-164. 
Whittle A. (2008) From Flexibility to Work-Life Balance: Exploring the Changing Discourses of 
Management Consultants. Organization 15: 513-534. 
Whittle A and Spicer A. (2008) Is actor network theory critique? Organization Studies 29: 611-629. 
Zald MN and Lounsbury M. (2010) The Wizards of Oz: Towards an Institutional Approach to Elites, 
Expertise and Command Posts. Organization Studies 31: 963-996. 
 
 
